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R e s e a e c h  A s s i s t a n t  
F b e e  TJn t v e r s i t y  o r  B r u s s e l s
Recently Belgium extended its territorial sea (1) up to 12 nautical miles. 
The government bill, already approved by the House of Représentatives, 
passed the Senate just before the latter entered into its summer recess (2).
The object of this paper is to take a eloser look at the Belgian position on 
this matter. First a brief description will be given of the changed inter­
national setting relating to the exact extent of the territorial sea. In the 
structure so described, the Belgian attitude will be filled in throughout the 
different phases. Next, the situation will be looked at from a municipal 
point of view, discerning the different steps in the tortuous road by which 
Belgium finally managed to reach this position. Before reaching conclusions, 
a succinct description will be attempted of similar Dutch, French and British 
législation on this topic, i.e. countries which share a maritime boundary 
with Belgium, making it possible to place the new Belgian enactment in 
its proper perspective.
I .  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  S e t t in g
The exact breadth of the territorial sea is one of those issues of inter­
national law which lingered on for a long time without receiving a clear-cut
(1) The present article will prefer the term territorial sea and avoid the term territorial 
waters, except with respect to the préparation of the 1930 Codification Conference of the League 
of Nations, were it was widely used. In international law the term territorial sea gained the 
upper hand over territorial waters, although some countries today still adhéré to the latter 
concept. The Soviet Union for instance consistently uses the following expression in its muni­
cipal législation : « territorial waters [territorial sea] ». As far as Belgium is cpncerned, a lot of 
confusion existed with respect to the exact meaning of the term territorial, waters during the 
first half of the 20th century, in internai législation as well as in the Works of publicists. For a 
good overview see note of Gakshof vaist dee Meersch, under Cour de cassation, 23 November 
1963, Pasicrisies I, pp. 376, 378-379 (1963). At present the notion territorial sea is generally 
accepted.
(2) Loi fixant la largeur de la mer territoriale belge. This law passed the House of Représen­
tatives on 15 January and the Senate on 18 July 1987 (Moniteur belge du, 22 octobre 1987). 
The text can be found in appendix.
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answer. At first a consensus appeared to emerge around a 3-mile limit, 
but later this gradually shifted towards the 12-mile limit (3). The United 
Nations, as well as its predecessor the League of Nations, thought at 
several occasions this topic to be ripe for codification. At the end of the 
1920’s the 3-mile limit was believed to be at its strongest. The principle, 
while not infrequently attacked in theory, was supreme in practice (4). 
The time, therefore, seemed right to attempt to reach an international 
agreement on the question of territorial waters. The Assembly of the 
League of Nations acted accordingly by convening an international co­
dification conference, which included this topic in its agenda (5). National 
views on this matter proved to be so widely divergent, that when the 
Conference came to an end, no formai voting was attemped. The Final Act 
of the Conference was a very hollow statement, stripped of ail articles on 
which no agreement could be reached. The breadth of the territorial sea 
consequently formed no part of it (6).
In 1958 a first conference on the law of the sea took place under the 
auspices of the United Nations (7). Four conventions resulted out of this 
effort, but once again, no solution could be found with respect to the 
breadth of the territorial sea (8). Together with fisheries, the breadth of 
the territorial sea caused the General Assembly to convene a second confe­
rence two years later (9). At this Conference Canada and the United States 
introduced a joint compromise proposai based on the so-called six and six 
formula : A  territorial sea of 6 miles combined with an exclusive fishing 
zone extending from the outer limit of the territorial sea to a maximum 
distance of 12 miles (10). In the Committee of the Whole this proposai was 
adopted (11). In plenary, however, where according to the rules of procedure
(3) For a good overview, see S. Swabztrauber, The Three-Mile Limit of Territorial Seas, 
Annapolis, Naval Institute Press, 316 p. (1972).
(4) T. B a t y , The Three-Mile Limit, 22 Am. J. Int'l L., 603, 503 (1928).
(5) Resolution adopted by the Assembly of the League of Nations on 27 September 1927, 
reprinted in 1 S. Rosenne, League of Nations Committee of Experts for the Progressive Codifi­
cation of International law 1925-1928, p. xoiii (1972). The Conference took place in The Hague 
from 13 March until 13 April 1930.
(6) League of Nations Doc. 228.M.11Ö.1930.V (L .N . Pub. N° 1930.V.7), reprinted in Actes 
de la conférence pour la codification du droit international, Vol. X, p. 139, 165.
(7) Hereinafter cited as Unclos I. Held in Geneva from 24 February until 27 April 1958.
(8) The only indication given was Art. 24 [2] of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and 
the Contiguous Zone (hereinafter cited as 1958 Convention) done at Geneva on 29 April 1958, 
516 tJnited Nations Treaty Series (hereinafter cited as Unts) 205, which reads : « The conti­
guous zone may not extend beyond twelve miles from the baseline from which the breadth of 
the territorial sea is measured ». Entered into force on 10 September 1964.
(9) Hereinafter cited as Unolos II. Held in Geneva from 17 Maroh until 26 April 1960.
(10) Canadian-U.S. proposai, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.19/C.1/L.10 (8 April 1960), Conférence des 
Nations Unies pour le droit de la mer, Documents officiels (hereinafter cited as Unolos [fr]) II, 
p. 183 (1960) and A/Conf.19/L.11 (22 April 1960), U nclos [fr] II, pp. 186-187 (1960).
(11) 43 in favour, 33 against, 12 abstentions, Comptes rendus analytiques de la vingt- 
huitième séance (13 avril 1960), Unolos [fr] II, pp. 161, 162 (1960).
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a two-thirds majority was required (12), this compromise failed by just 
one vote (13).
Ever since the failure of these two Conferences (1958-1960) more and 
more states enacted législation extending their territorial seas up to 12 nau- 
tical miles. At the beginning of 1960 only 30 % of ail territorial sea claims 
established a 12 nautical mile zone (14). According to the last report of the 
Secretary-General this figure reached the cape of 100 (15), meaning that 
today about 75 % of the total territorial sea claims adhéré to the 12-mile 
rule. Although this figure does not reflect the différences which actually 
exist between Coastal states (as there are the lenght of coastlines or the 
impact on law of the sea matters), it gives at least an impression of the 
evolving général tendency.
A third conference of the United Nations convened for this purpose (16) 
reflect s this évolution. The outcome of that Conference was written down 
in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Art. 3 of which 
reads : « Every State has the right to establish the breadth of its territorial 
sea up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles, measured from the base­
lines determined in accordance with this Convention» (17).
II. P o sit io n  of  B e l g iu m
The preliminary work of the 1930 Hague Conference was entrusted to a 
Committee of Experts and later on to a Preparatory Committee. In the 
Committee of Experts, which consisted of 16 internationally renowned 
jurists, Belgium was represented by Professor C. De Visscher. The report of 
Mr. Schücking, rapporteur on the question of territorial waters who labeled 
the extent of the territorial sea as the most difficult problem (18), proposed
(12 ) Rules of Procedure adopted by the Conference ( A /C o n f .1 9 /7 ) ,  rules 35 and 49 , U n - 
c l o s  [fr] II, pp. x x v i i ,  x x i x - x x x  and x x x i  (1 9 6 0 ).
(13) 54 in favour, 28 against, 6 abstentions. Comptes rendus analytiques de la treizième 
séance plénière (26 avril 1960), U n c l o s  [fr] II, pp. 29, 32 (1960). A  second vote on the question, 
requested by the United States, did not alter the situation : 50 in favour, 29 against, 8 absten­
tions. Ibid., p. 33.
(14 ) R .  S m ith , Exclusive Economie Zone Claims, D o r d r e c h t ,  M a rtin u s  N ijh o ff ,  p .  7 (1 986 ).
(15) United Nations, Law of the Sea : Report of the Secretary General, U.N. Doc. A/41/742 
(28 October 1986), p. 6.
(16) Hereinafter cited as U n o l o s  III. Held in différent places between 1973 and 1982.
(17) Opened for signature on 10 December 1982, reprinted in United Nations, The Law of 
the Sea : United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (U.N. Pub. Sales n° E.83.V.5). 
Hereinafter cited as 1982 Convention. This Convention, according to its Art. 308 [1], will enter 
into force 12 months affcer 60 states have ratified it or acceded to it. As of March 1987, 31 states 
and one entity ratified this Convention. See Law of the Sea Bulletin, Special Number (March 
1987), p. 1.
(18) Mémoire présenté par M. Sohüokino, Questionnaire n° 2, in Rapport au Conseil de la 
Sooiété des Nations sur les questions qui paraissent avoir obtenu le degré de maturité suffisant 
pour un règlement international (Questionnaires nos 1 à 7 (hereinafter cited as Report), League 
of Nations Doc. C.196.M.70.1927.V (L.N. Pub. No. 1927.V.1), pp. 29, 33.
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a 6-mile limit (19). This figure was however reduced to 3 in the draft 
convention submitted to the different governments for comment (20). It is 
interesting to note that Belgium did not reply to the questionnaire on 
territorial waters in time for it to be included in the Final Report of the 
Committee of Experts (21). When a Preparatory Committee was appointed 
early 1929 to prepare the preliminary documents for the Conference itself, 
the letter transmitted by the Belgian government of 19 December 1928 
was incorporated in volume II of the bases of discussion, entitled « Territo­
rial Waters ». In here Belgium made reference to a series of municipal 
enactments and international conventions concluded by it which all asserted 
different kinds of jurisdiction in a belt of 3 nautical miles in front of the 
Belgian coast. In theory, none of them fixed the breadth of the territorial 
sea as such and, therefore, Belgium could allow itself to close this topic 
with an open-ended formula : These enactments and conventions « ne 
préjugent en aucune façon de l ’étendue que la Belgique pourrait revendiquer 
pour ses eaux territoriales, conformément à des principes internationaux 
nouveaux substitués à l ’ancienne et désuète doctrine étendant ces eaux à la 
portée maxima des pièces d’artillerie » (22). During the Conference itself, 
however, members were asked to state the position of their respective 
governments right to the point and Mr. de Ruelle said for Belgium : « La 
Belgique accepte la zone de trois milles marins avec zone contiguë » (23). 
The reason why Belgium acted so reluctantly was most probably expressed 
by Mr. Rolin, during that same Conference, when he stated : «. . .  le problème 
n’est pas soluble par la méthode de codification » (24).
Unolos I  was prepared by the International Law Commission of the 
United Nations. No Belgian national formed part of this body, but on 
several occasions the national points of view were requested from the 
different governments on this subject. In 1956 the Belgian government 
transmitted a circumstantial report to the International Law Commission. 
With respect to the breadth of the territorial sea the note proposed a
(19) Ibid., p. 58.
(20) Ibid., p. 72. See also notes on this draft article p. 74.
(21) It replied to 8 out of the 11 questionnaires sent to governments. See Réponses des 
gouvernements aux questionnaires, in Report, supra note 18, pp. 140-142 and Réponses des 
gouvernements aux questionnaires, in Deuxième rapport au Conseil de la Société des Nations, 
sur les questions qui paraissent avoir obtenu le degré de maturité suffisant pour un règlement 
international (Questionnaires nos 8 à 11), League of Nations Doc. A.16.1928.V (L.N. Pub. 
No. 1928.V.4), pp. 61-62.
(22) Lettre du 19 décembre 1928, reprinted in «Bases de discussion établies par le comité 
préparatoire à l ’intention de la conférence », Volume II : Eaux territoriales, League of Nations 
Doc. C.74.M.39.1929.V (L.N. Pub. n° 1929.V.2), pp. 119-121. See especially p. 120.
(23) Procès-verbaux de la treizième séance de la deuxième commission (3 avril 1930), Actes 
de la conférence pour la codification du droit international, Vol. III, League of Nations Doc. 
C.315 (b).M.145(b).1930.V, p. 123, 123(1930).
(24) Procès-verbaux de la quinzième séance (7 avril 1930), Actes de la conférence pour la 
codification du droit international, Vol. III, League of Nations Doc. C.315(b).M.145(b).1930.V, 
pp. 150, 151 (1930).
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regime were states could claim a territorial sea up to an absolute maximum 
of 12 miles. Ail claims, however, reaching beyond 3 miles would need to be 
recognized on the basis of an international agreement (25). During the 
worlc of the First Committee at U n o lo s  I  Mr. Muûls, the Belgian représen­
tative, reiterated that Belgium had always adhered to a 3-mile limit and 
that it saw no good reason to change its attitude (26). It should be kept in 
mind that during U no lo s  I the 3-mile limit was in fact never put to a vote. 
Even the United Nations whose main objective was the préservation of 
the 3-mile limit (27) came pretty soon to the conclusion that such a position 
was unrealistic, especially after a United Kingdom proposai, which stated 
that the limit should not extend beyond 6 miles, with the proviso that 
this should not affect existing rights of passage for aircraft and vessels in 
the outer 3 miles (28), was withdrawn in the First Committee (29). Also 
Belgium mitigated its initial stand and during the work of this Committee 
Belgium voted in favour (30) of a (rejected) American draft, designed to 
establish a six and six formula as explained above. In the outer 6 miles 
states would be allowed to continue their fishing activities if they had fished 
in that région during the last five years (31). An identical draft was initiated 
by the United States in plenary (32). Although Belgium voted in favour, 
the proposai was rejected (33).
During U nolos  I in other words, Belgium had showed its willingness to 
compromise (34). At the same time, however, Belgium made it crystal 
clear that the 3-mile limit remained unimpaired and unaffected by any o f 
the proposais made during that Conference. Or to use the words of Mr.
(25) Observations du Gouvernement belge sur le projet d’articles provisoires relatifs au 
régime de la haute mer et le projet d’articles relatifs au régime de la mer territoriale adoptés 
par la Commission du droit international à. sa septième session en 1956 (9 janvier 1956), U.N. 
Doc. A/CN.4/99, reprinted in (1966) 2 Annuaire de la Commission du droit international pp. 37, 
39. Belgium also submitted a report relating to the délimitation of the territorial sea. See 
infra note 166.
(26) Comptes rendus analytiques de la dix-septième séance (19 avril 1958), 3 U n c l o s  [fr] I , 
pp. 56, 57 (1958).
(27) W . H e a u n , The Law of the Sea, the 1968 Geneva Convention, JAG  Journal, pp. 3, 
29 (March-April 1960). Also the opening statement of the American délégation leaves no room 
for doubt on this questions. See Comptes rendus analytiques delà dixième séance (11 mars 1958),
3 U n c l o s  [fr] I ,  p p .  28 , 2 8 -3 0  (1 9 5 8 ).
(28) Revised proposai of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 
U.N. Doc. A/Coni-.13/C.1/L.134 (1 April 1958), 3 U n c l o s  [fr] I, p. 271, 271 (1958).
(29) Comptes rendus analytiques de la cinquante-sixième séance (19 avril 1958), 3 Unolos 
[fr] I, p. 193, 197 (1958).
(30) Comptes rendus analytiques de la cinquante-septième séance (19 avril 1958), 3 U n o l o s  
[fr] I, pp. 197, 199 (1958).
(31) U .S .A. proposai, U.N. Doc. A/CoNF.13/C.l/L.159/Rev. 2 (19 April 1958), 3 U n o l o s  [fr] 
I, p. 277, 277 (1958).
(32) U.S.A. proposai, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.13/L.29 (24 April 1958), 2 U n o l o s  [fr] I, pp. 142- 
143 (1958).
(33 ) C o m p te s  ren d u s  a n a ly t iq u e s  d e  la  q u a to rz iè m e  séa n ce  p lé n iè re  (2 5  a v r il  195 8 ), 2 U n -  
c l o s  [ fr ]  I, p p .  41 , 4 6 (1 9 6 8 ) .
(34) Note, Le droit de la mer à la Conférence de Genève, 12 Chronique de Politique Etrangère, 
pp. 1, 34 (1959).
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Muûls : « Si toutefois l ’on ne peut aboutir à un compromis, le Gouvernement 
belge considérera que la règle des trois milles reste inchangée » (35). Of the 
four conventions ensuing out of these délibérations Belgium signed not a 
single one at that time. The major reason was to be found exactly in the 
absence of précisé figures delimiting the different zones, with the emphasis 
of course on the territorial sea and the baleful influence this could have on 
the Belgian fishery industry which traditionally relied on the high seas for 
its resources (36).
The international setting during the inter-conference period started to 
deteriorate even further when looked upon from a Belgian point of view. 
The initial United States draft submitted to U nolos II  was once more 
based on the six and six formula, but the rights foreign states had in the 
fishery zone were more restricted. Fishing activities of foreign states could 
not exceed the level of recent years and would also be restricted to recently 
fished areas and species of fish (37). The final Canadian-United States 
proposai (38) went even further by providing for a phasing-out period 
of 10 years, after which these foreign fishing activities would no longer be 
tolerated. The Belgian délégation found itself consequently in a very 
difficult position. The Conference had turned a deaf ear to the plea of 
Mr. Nisot at the beginning of the Conference to attribute special attention 
to the peculiar position of Belgium (39). The latter could have been inclined, 
be it with great sacrifice, to accept the original United States draft. It 
could not, however, agree to the terms of the joint Canadian-United States 
proposai, which would simply resuit in the annihilation of the Belgian 
fishery industry (40). Belgium as a conséquence, dit not vote in favour but 
abstained when this proposai was put to a vote (41). Mr. van der Essen 
explained this not totally negative vote by the fact that the Canadian- 
United States proposai was the most moderated of ail those submitted. 
At the same time he stressed that the Belgian abstention did not embody a 
Belgian endeavour to enlarge the territorial sea to more than 6 miles (42). 
In plenary, where the voting margin was expected to be rather narrow (43),
(36) Comptes rendus analytiques de la cinquante-neuvième séance (21 avril 1958), 3 Un- 
c l o s  [fr] I, p p .  202, 203 (1958).
(36) Question n° 29 of Mr. Dehousse, Lilar and Rolin of 6 March 1963 addressed to the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bulletin of Questions and Answers, Senate, 1962-1963, n° 20, 2 April
1963, pp. 504-505.
(37) United States proposai, U .N . Doo. A/Conf.19/C.1/L.3 (23 March 1960), U n o l o s  [fr] II, 
pp. 180-181 (1960).
(38 ) Proposai of 22 April 1960, see supra note 10 and accompanying text.
(39 ) C o m p te s  re n d u s  a n a ly t iq u e s  d e  la  d ix -h u it iè m e  séa n ce  (6  a v r il 1960), U n o l o s  [ fr ]  I I ,  
p p .  113 , 114 (1 9 6 0 ).
(40) Comptes rendus analytiques de la vingt-huitième séance de la Commission plénière (13 
avril 1960), U n o l o s  [fr] II, pp. 161, 164(1960).
(41) Comptes rendus analytiques de la vingt-huitième séance de la Commission plénière (13 
avril 1960), U n o l o s  [fr] II, pp. 161, 162 (1960).
(42 ) Ibid., p .  164.
(43) See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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Belgium even voted in favour of this proposai (44) simply because it did not 
want to bear the responsibility for its failure (45). As in 1958, the last words 
of the Belgian représentative on this question emphasized that the initial 
position of Belgium remained unaltered by this vote (46).
The end of Unglos II  with its failure to reaoh an agreement on this topic, 
also heralded a period of unilatéral extensions beyond the 3-mile limit, 
either in the form of a territorial sea (47) or fishery zone (48). The latter 
found its first eonventional approval in the London Convention of 1964 (49). 
Once again, it was the six and six formula which formed the basis of this 
Convention. In a zone up to 6 nautical miles the Coastal state had exclusive 
fishing rights. In a belt located between 6 and 12 nautical miles attention 
had to be paid to other contracting states with historie rights in that zone. 
No phasing-out period was provided for, but catches should not exceed 
their former levels. Such a regime was certainly not to the advantage of 
Belgium, but being the best possible international compromise to be 
obtained, the explanatory memorandum accompanying the Belgian bill to 
approve this Convention stated : « ... la politique la plus réaliste commandait 
d’accepter la négociation et de s’efforcer au cours de celle-ci de défendre au 
mieux les intérêts des pêcheurs belges » (50).
Although the London Fisheries Convention did not touch upon the 
problem of the extent of the territorial sea stricto sensu, it did have its 
impact on the latter, and, more particularly, as will be seen, on the Belgian 
position towards the 1958 Convention. Indeed, the Belgian government was 
mostly concerned with the necessity of its fishermen to fish in front of the 
coast of other countries. This certainly did not mean the coast of ail the 
other coastal states, but rather of those coasts usually fished by Belgian 
nationals. Therefore, the fear that coastal states would unilaterally extend 
their territorial seas related mostly to other European states. Or to use the 
words of Mr. Rolin, uttered during the 1930 Codification Conference :
(44) See supra note 13.
(45) « La Belgique ... avait presque tout à perdre à se rallier à la proposition en question, 
mais elle n’a pas voulu prendre la responsabilité de faire échouer ce qui lui semblait être la 
dernière chance d’accord. Elle était prête à consentir des sacrifices très lourds pour que soit 
établie une règle de droit international ». See comptes rendus de la quatorzième séance plénière 
(26 avril 1960), U n o l o s  [fr] II, p. 34, 34 (1960).
(46) « Le compromis proposé n’ayant pas recueilli la majorité requise, le Gouvernement 
belge ne se considère pas comme lié par le vote qu’il a émis >. Ibid.
(47) See supra notes 14 and 15 and accompanying text.
(48 ) For a chronological table and analysis, see S. O d a , International Law of the Resources of 
the Sea, Alphen aan den Rijn, Sijthoff & ÜSToordhoff, pp. 17-23 (1979).
(49) M . F it z m a .tjbio e -L a c h s , The Légal Regime of the Baltic Sea Fisheries, 29 Neth. Int'l L. 
Rev. pp. 174, 201-202 (1982). For a description of this Convention see Y . v a n  der M e n s - 
bktjgghe & B. D e  S o h u t t e r , Les zones de pêche exclusives et la convention de Londres du 9 mars
1964, in La Belgique et le droit de la mer, Actes du Colloque conjoint du 21 et 22 avril 1967, 
Bruxelles, Editions de l ’institut de Sociologie de l ’Université Libre de Bruxelles, pp. 63-94 
(1969).
(50) Documenta of the House of Représentatives of 30 December 1964, n° 926/1 (1964-1965), 
p p . 1-4.
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« J ’avoue qu’en ce qui concerne la Belgique, le tracé des côtes territoriales 
dans les trois quarts du monde nous est assez indifférent . . . » (51). Since 
the London Convention, in other words, adequately alleviated this particular 
concern in the eyes of the Belgian go ver n ment (52) the latter acceded to 
the 1958 Convention on 6 January 1972, i.e. just in time before U nolos III 
started its work.
Typical of U no lo s  III was certainly the lack of a single preparatory text 
on which the Conference could fall back as a working document (53). 
During the général debate in 1974 Mr. van der Essen outlined the Belgian 
position. Inspired by the international practice of states more and more 
extending their territorial seas, Belgium expressed its readiness to agree to 
an extension of the limit to 12 nautical miles (54). It also co-sponsored 
together with other geographically disadvantaged states, a draft on the 
territorial sea in that direction : « Each State shall have the right to establish 
the breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical 
miles . . .» (55). I f  one compares this article with Art. 3 of the 1982 Conven­
tion (56) it becomes clear that the content remained unchanged.
(51) Procès-verbaux de la quinzième séance (7 avril 1930), awpra note 23, p. 161.
(52) Parliamentary Annals, Senate, 1966-1967, n° 63, 29 June 1967, pp. 1746, 1747. It did 
not alleviate the Belgian concerns regarding the Convention on the Continental Shelf. Belgium 
never adhered to this Convention, not so much because of its own continental shelf but mainly 
because of the possible abuse third countries could make of this imperfect légal construction. 
See Y . van d e r  Mensbrttgghe, « La mer et les communautés européennes », 5, Revue Belge de 
Droit International, pp. 87, 128 (1969).
(53) Contrary to the 1930 Hague Codification Conference as well as to U n o l o s  I, the prepar­
atory work of this Conference had not been entrusted to an expert body of jurists, of limited 
size, but instead to a broad political body. See on this topic for example J.-P. Levy, La Confé­
rence des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer, Paris, Pédone, pp. 33 and 43 (1983) and T .  K o h  & 
S. Jayakumau, Negotiating Process of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the 
Sea, in 1 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 : A  Commentary (M. Nordquist, 
éd.), Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, pp. 29, 29-31 and 45-46 (1985). During this preliminary work 
Belgium only hinted obliquely at the extent of the territorial sea. Already in 1971 a document 
on the limits and status of an international zone, a maximum territorial sea of 12 nautical miles 
was put forward, be it between parentheses. See draft articles of Austria, Belgium, Hungary, 
Népal, N eth erlan d B  and Singapore (19 August 1971), Art. I  (A), U .N . Doc. A /AC .138/55, 
Teprinted in Rapport du comité des utilisations pacifiques du fond des mers et des océans au-delà 
des limites de la juridiction nationale, Assemblée générale, Documents officiels, Supp. n °  21 
(A/8421), pp. 193, 193 (1971). Belgium also co-sponsored a draft on resource jurisdiction of 
coastal states beyond the territorial sea, in which the exact breadth of the territorial sea was left 
open. See draft articles of Afghanistan, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Nepal and Singapore (16 
July 1973), Art. 1 (1), U .N , Doc. A/AC.138/SC.II/L.39, reprinted in Rapport du comité des 
utilisations pacifiques du fond des mers et des océans au-delà des limites de la juridiction 
nationale, Vol. 3, Assemblée générale. Documents officiels, Supp. n °  21 (A/9021), p. 100, 100 
(1973).
(54) Summary Records of the 39th Plenary Meeting (12 July 1974), 1 Third United Nations 
Conference on the Law of the Sea, Official Records (hereinafter cited as Unolos [e] III), 
p. 166, 167 (1975).
(55) Draft articles of Austria Belgium, Bolivia, Botswana, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet 
Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, Finland, Fédéral Republic of Germany, Hungary, Laos, 
Lesotho, Luxembourg, Mali, Mongolia, Netherlands, Paraguay, Singapore, Swaziland, Sweden, 
Uganda, Upper Volta and Zambia (31 July 1974), 3 U n c l o s  [e] III, p. 212, 212 (1975). A  draft 
on fisheries sponsored by Belgium a few days later took once more a territorial sea of 12 miles as
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At the eleventh hour Belgium signed this Convention (57). In a déclaration 
made upon signature of the Convention the Belgian government showed its 
full endorsement of the principle enshrined in Art. 3 : « The limitation of the 
breadth of the territorial sea, as established by article 3 of the Convention, 
confirms and codifies a widely observed customary practice which it is 
incumbent on every State to respect, as it is the only one admitted by 
international law : the Government of the Kingdom of Belgium will not 
therefore recognize, as territorial sea, waters which aTe, or may be, claimed 
to be such beyond 12 nautical miles measured from baselines determined by 
the riparian State in accordance with the Convention» (58).
This brief history will provide the reader with a sufficiënt background to 
understand more accurately the Belgian législative action in this respect.
III. B e l g ia n  m u n ic ip a l  l é g is l a t io n
A) 3-miles
The 3-mile limit, consistently claimed by the Belgian government, is not 
that easily encountered in its municipal législation. Instead, different zones 
were claimed for different purposes over the years (59) : A custom zone 
was for instance established in 1832 (60) ; fishing was prohibited within a 
belt of 3 miles, measured from the low-water line in 1891 (61) ; a neutrality 
zone of the same distance was proclaimed in 1939 (62). The enactment 
generally referred to when documenting the Belgian 3-mile territorial sea 
claim (63), moreover, only talked about coastal waters, when in fact meaning
basis. See draft articles of Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany (Fédéral Republic of), Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg and Netherlands (5 and 28 August 1974), Art. 4 and note 17, 3 U n o l o s  [e] 
III, p. 217, 217 (1975). The other proposais sponsored or co-sponsored by Belgium during the 
initial phase of U n o l o s  III (see A. v a n  d e r  E s s e n ,  « La Belgique et le droit de la mer », 10 
Revue Belge deDroit International, pp. 102, 114-118 [1975]) did make no reference to the breadth 
of the territorial sea.
(66) See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
(57) The Convention was opened for signature on 10 December 1982. The elosing date for 
signature was 9 December 1984. Belgium signed on 6 December 1984.
(68) English translation from the original French version, reprinted in United Nations, 
The Law of the Sea : Status of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, (U.N. Pub. 
Salee n° E.86.V.5) pp. 7, 8-9 (1986).
(59) For a more exhaustive coverage, see the letter Belgium sent to the Preparatory Com­
mittee of the 1930 Hague Codification Conference : Lettre du 19 décembre 1928, supra note 22, 
p. 120.
(60) Loi du 7 juin 1832 qui établit un rayon unique de douane, Art. 1, Bulletin Officiel, 
n° X L V  (443), pp. 542-544. Pasinomie (Sér. 3, Tom. 2) 1931-1932, pp. 356-357. For further 
references see M . V a n  G o e t h e m , The Status of the Territorial Sea (in Dutch), Brugge, Die Keure, 
p. 27 note 1 (1963).
(61) Loi du 19 août 1891 relative à la pêche maritime dans les eaux territoriales, Art. 1, 
Moniteur belge du 29 août 1891. Pasinomie (Sér. 4, Tom. 26) 1891, pp. 356-357.
(62) Déclaration de neutralité de la Belgique, Art. 1, Moniteur belge du 3 septembre 1939 (2e 
édition). Pasinomie (Sér. 6, Tom. 6) 1939, pp. 469-471.
(63) See for instance the list annexed to the official records of U n o l o s  II, U n o l o s  [fr] II, 
p. 170, 170 (1960). Reference is made to the enactment of 1929. See infra note 64.
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thè territorial sea (64). Later reforms of this enactment remedied this short- 
coming (65). It should nonetheless be noted that until the new law enters into 
force, the breadth of the Belgian territorial sea has always been regulated by 
royal decree, and not by law. In a note sent to the Secretary-General of 
the United Nations of 7 December 1979, the Belgian government explicitly 
stated that Belgium never adopted a law to fix the breadth of its territorial 
sea at 3 miles. Instead it referred to customary law and the 1958 Convention, 
to which Belgium is a party (66).
B) 12-miles.
The changing international setting, as outlined above, as well as the 
graduai acquiescence of the Belgian government in the fact that the 3-mile 
rule tended to fall into oblivion, were certainly major instigating factors for 
Belgium to reconsider the problem of the extent of its territorial sea. 
Others complete the picture.
Special attention in this respect should also be paid to the problem of 
pollution. It is a well known fact that the North Sea —  and the Belgian 
coast does certainly not form an exception to the général rule — belongs to 
the worst polluted sea areas in the world (67). This could have a very 
detrimental effect on the tourist industry, which for the Belgian coast 
amounts up to 25 million tourist nights a year(68). Also its influence on 
the ecosystem in the région (69), and thus also of the local fishery stocks is 
not to be underestimated (70).
The major marine sources (i.e. which find their origin in the coastal 
waters) of pollution normally enumerated in this respect are shipping on 
the one hand and hydrocarbon extraction on the other. The latter can be 
neglected when applied to Belgian coastal waters. This must be considered 
as one of the (few) positive spin-offs of the absence o f any promising hydro­
carbon deposits in the Belgian continental shelf région (71). The dense
(64) Arrêté royal du 22 janvier 1929 portant règlement de police de la navigation dans les 
eaux du littoral belge et de ses ports, Arts. 1-2, Moniteur belge du 22 février 1929. Pasino­
mie (Sér. 6, Tom. 20) 1929, pp. 8-12. See also supra note 1.
(65) A lot of modifications of this royal decree took place over the years, the last one being 
the Arrêté royal du 4 août 1981, portant règlement de police et de navigation pour la mer 
territoriale belge, les ports et les plages du littoral belge, Arts. 1-2, Moniteur belge du 1 sep­
tembre 1981 ; errât. Moniteur du 27 octobre 1981. Pasinomie (Sér. 7) 1981, pp. 1349-1361.
(66) Reprinted in 2 Law of the Sea Bulletin (December 1983) p. 7 (1983).
(67) A. Couper, éd., Atlas of the Oceanst London, Times Books Ltd., pp. 172-173 (1983).
(68) N. Vanhove, Tourism at the Belgian Coast (in Dutch with English summary), 5 Water 
(n° 31, November-December 1986), p. 20, 23.
(69) C, H eep , « The Ecology of the North Sea », (in Dutch with English summary), 5 Water 
(n° 31, November-December 1986), p. 13, 14. This author states that parts of Belgian coastal 
waters belong to the poorest of the world with respect to macrobenthic biomass and diversity.
(70) P. Hovaut, The Fishery on the Belgian Continental Shelf (in Dutch with English summ­
ary), 5 Water (n° 31, November-December 1986), p. 18, 19.
(71) This d u e  to the structure of the Belgian continental shelf. See S. H e n r i e t , The Pre- 
Quaternary Basement of the Belgian Continental Shelf (in Dutch with English summary), 5 
Water (n° 31, November-December 1986), pp. 10-11.
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traffic in the neighbouring waters, on the other hand, plays a primordial 
rôle in the évaluation of methods capable of reducing oil pollution in front 
of the Belgian coast. The proximity of the Straits of Dover, which constitutes 
the busiest strait used for international navigation in the world today (72), 
has to be stressed in this respect. The coastal waters facing the Belgian 
coast are eut through by different navigational channels (See map). First we 
have the Noord Hinder South IMO approved traffic séparation scheme 
which runs for about 85 % on the Belgian side if a theoretical médian line 
were to be drawn between Belgium and the United Kingdom. This route 
runs almost parallel to the coast in a north-easterly direction, where it 
joins the Noord Hinder Junction Precautionary Area. Secondly there is 
the main entrance to the river Scheldt through the IMO approved traffic 
séparation scheme of West Hinder. This West Hinder-Ylissingen route 
starts south of the West Hinder Bank. From there it runs in an easterly 
direction in front of the Belgian coast avoiding the Akkeart Bank and 
passing north of the Wandelaar and the Bol van Heist by means of the 
Scheur (73). This route finally leaves Belgian coastal waters in front of the 
Zwin (74). Furthermore, there are the entrance routes to the ports of 
Nieuwpoort, Ostend and Zeebrugge.
Under the 3-mile rule only part of these entrance routes to the coastal 
ports and a negligible stretch of the West Hinder-Vlissingen route, did 
form part of the Belgian territorial sea. If, however, Belgium would proclaim 
a 12-mile territorial sea, about 75 % of the West Hinder-Vlissingen route 
in front of its coast would be comprised by the Belgian territorial sea. It 
should be stressed that the latter would not entail any additional coast for 
the Belgian government as far as buoyage is concerned (75). Belgium might 
actually be better of with an extended territorial sea for it often proved 
difficult in practice to recover the expenses made to repair buoys when 
ships came into collision with them outside that zone.
The inclusion of areas of intensive navigation within the territorial sea of a 
state in order to obtain the necessary législative and enforcement powers 
to cope with environmental pollution or threat of such pollution, is a
(72) See for an elaborated study on the subject L. C u y v e r s , The Strait of Dover, Dordrecht, 
Martinus Nijhoff, 142 p. (1986). It should be noted that the author defined the Straits of Dover 
for the purpose of his study rather broadly. The Belgian coast and neighbouring wUters do form 
part of it.
(73) A second route south of the Wandelaar and the Bol van Heist through the Wielingen 
was not so long ago introduced as an amendment to the traffic séparation scheme at West 
Hinder. The International Maritime Organization approved the amendment, but on further 
considération, mainly due to high buoyage costs, the Belgian government never implemented 
this scheme. The last change implemented by Belgium concerns the West Hinder area itself. 
See Notices to Marinera (in Dutch) of 13 March 1986 (n° 6/66) pp. 1-3 and annex.
(74) See chart Noordzee Vlaamse Banken, Hydrografische Dienst der Kust, published by 
the Ministry of Public Works, Brussels, February 1987.
(75) A  technical agreement actually in force between Belgium, France, the Netherlands 
and the United Kingdom divides the ocean between these countries in this respect.
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Source : P. De W o lf , «The Network 'Vlaamse Banken’ » (in Dutch), 5 Water (n° 31, 
November-December 1986), pp. 60, 62. Adapted.
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well-known practice. A  good example is the GermanBight where the Fédéral 
Republic of Germany, while generally claiming a 3-mile territorial sea, 
especially extended its territorial limits in order to be better equipped to 
ensure the safety of navigation in that région (76). Indeed, international 
law proved to be insufficiënt to tackle the problem of maritime casualties 
which occurred outside the territorial sea of a coastal state. I f  such an 
incident happened within the territorial sea, no problem arose for the 
coastal state because of its sovereign powers there (77). However, on the 
high seas, where the old customary principle of freedom reigned, exceptions 
were only tolerated if provided by either customary or treaty law. Under 
customary law, the much debated principle of self-help was at times invoked, 
based on the old ruling of the United States Supreme Court (1804) in the 
case Church v Hubbart (78). But this ruling being rather vague, its applica­
tion was difficult (79). As far as treaty law is concerned, prior to 1969, 
Art. 24 of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas (80), which covered 
pollution prévention on the high seas, referred to existing treaty provisions 
for further guidance. The only major treaty on the subject, the 1954 London 
Oil p o l  Convention (81), bestowed the flag state with exclusive control of 
ships on the high seas. This whole system, however, proved to be deficient, 
and in 1969 a special international convention on the subject was ela- 
borated : the Intervention Convention (82). This Convention worked out a 
system where coastal states were allowed to take protective measures 
beyond their territorial seas under certain circumstances. Since it only 
applied to pollution by oil it was supplemented later on by the so-called 
Protocol of 1973, which broadened its field of application to other polluting 
substances as well (83). Where the 1969 Intervention Convention binds
(76) J. Kokoi/e & L. Gundlestg, « Die Erweiterung der deutschen Küstengewâsser in der 
Nordsee, 45 Zeitschrift für auslàndisches, oÿ entlich.es Recht und Vôlkerrecht, pp. 676-693 (1986). 
See also R. L a g o n i , « The Fédéral Republic of Germany and the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea », 2 Infl. J. Estuarine db Coastal L .t pp. 86-91 (1987).
(77) R. M ’ G o n ig l e  & M . Z a o h e r , Pollution, Politics and International Law, Berkeley, 
Univorsity of California Press, p. 147 (1979).
(78) U.S. Supreme Court, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 187, 2 L.Ed. 249 (1804).
(79) D. A b e c a s s is , The Law and Practice Relating to Oil Pollution From Ships, London, 
Butterworths, p. 87 (1978).
(80) Art. 24 of this Convention (done at Geneva on 29 April 1958, 450 U n t s  82, entered into 
force on 30 September 1962) reads : « Every State shall draw up régulations to prevent pollution 
of the seas by the discharge of oil from ships or pipelines or resulting from the exploitation and 
exploration of the seabed and its subsoil, taking account of existing treaty provisions on the 
subject ».
(81 ) International Convention for the Prévention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, done at 
London on 12 May 1964, 327 U n t s  3. Entered into force on 26  July 1958.
(82) International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in the Case of Oil 
Pollution Casualties, done at Brussels on 29 November 1969, 970 U n t s  211. Entered into force 
on 6 May 1975.
(83) Protocol Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Pollution by Substances 
Other than Oil, done at London on 2 November 1973, United Nations Législative Series, 
U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/18, pp. 467-517. Entered into force on 30 March 1983. This Protocol 
in fact constitutes a separate treaty for countries can be bound by it without being a party to 
the 1969 Intervention Convention.
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50 states at present, the Protocol is only applicable between 21 states (84). 
The powers entrusted to the coastal states by these conventions are more- 
over much more limited in scope than the sovereign powers attributed to a 
coastal state in its territorial sea.
As if to exemplify this point to the Belgian government, a collision 
occurred on 25 August 1984 between a French Bo : Ro cargo ship Mont 
Louis and the German ferry Olau Britannia some 10 miles north of Ostend. 
An invironmental disaster could be avoided, but the case is also illustrative 
of another area in which the coastal state lacks competence : the salvage of 
wrecks. In this case the Belgian government paid well over 300 million BF 
for the salvage of the wreek and has actually little hope to recover the 
expenses made (85). A lot has been written on this subject, but it is generally 
admitted that if Belgium had claimed a 12-mile territorial sea before the 
collision occurred, it would have found itself in a much better position 
than it actually holds (86). Its royal decree of 4 August 1981 as a matter of 
fact explicitly obliges the owners of sunken ships to remove their wrecks out 
of Belgian internai waters or its territorial sea (87).
Another factor which certainly stimulated Belgium to join the 12 nautical 
mile club was the example set by its continental neighbours. France ex- 
tended its territorial sea up to 12 miles in 1971 (88) and the Netherlands more 
recently in 1985 (89). Since bilatéral délimitation agreements concerning 
the territorial sea still have to be concluded on both sides, it might prove 
to be a more practical method to bring the extent of these waters up to the 
same limit first, before starting negotiations on délimitation. The explana- 
tory memorandum attached to the bill extending the territorial sea up
(84) Information obtained from the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Treaty-section (3 
July 1987). Corresponds with figures stated in the magazine of the International Maritime 
Organization « IMO News», n° 1, p. 2 (1987).
(86) The judioialproceedings are still lingering on. The only liope for the Belgian government 
remains the fact that the Mont Louis will not be found seaworthy for transport of the kind of 
oargo it did. See in that direction N. G a s k e l l , « Lessons of the Mont Louis. Part One : Préven­
tion of Hybrid Accidents », 1 Int'l J. Estuarine & Coastal L ., pp. 116, 123-124 (1986).
(86) E. F r a n c k x ,  « Juridical Aspects of the Mont-Louis Collision », (in Dutch with English 
summary), 5 Water (n° 31, November-December 1986), pp. 60, 61 ; R. P l a n c h a b ,  « S i la 
Belgique doit payer, c’est de notre faute (Mont Louis) », Lloyd Anversois du 15 octobre 1984 
and « Le projet de la loi sur la mer territoriale belge déposé », Lloyd Anversois du 18 novembre 
1986 ; G. S t a b k l e ,  « Les épaves de navires en haute mer et le droit international. Le cas du 
*Mont-Louis’ », 18 Revue Belge de Droit International, pp. 496, 526-527 (1984-1985/1) ; Y . v a n  
d e r  M e n s b r t t g g h e ,  « L ’affaire du Mont-Louis, une cargaison dangereuse, une épave gênante »,
16 Annuaire Français de Droit International, pp. 853, 863 (1984). This author stresses the fact 
that the extension of the territorial sea is a first step but that the final solution of the problem 
is to be found on the international plane ; J. V a n h o o f f , « The Case of the 'Mont-Louis* for the 
Association of Insurance Jurists i (in Dutch), Maritiem Recht en Verzekeringen, 10-11 February
1985, pp. 1, 3. The author seems to imply that the signing of the 1982 Convention suffices to 
extend the Belgian territorial waters up to 12 nautical miles, quod non.
(87) See supra note 65, Art. 22 (4-5).
(88) Loi n° 71-1060 du 24 décembre 1971, Journal Officiel du 30 décembre 1971, p. 12899.
(89) Wet van 9 januari 1985, houdende vaststelling van de grenzen van de territoriale zee 
van Nederland, Staatsblad 1985, n° 129.
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to 12 nautical miles, introdueed by the Belgian government to the House of 
Représentatives on 21 October 1986, as well as the oral statements made by 
the Minister of Foreign Affairs before the competent commissions of the 
House and Senate, only referred to the international setting when eluci- 
dating the underlying motives (90).
Although the pithy original draft, as worked out by the government, 
contained only three articles, it underwent significant changes before being 
promulgated by the Executive Branch. First of ail it was sent to the Conseil 
d’Etat, which pointed out that reference to the baseline from which the 
breadth of the territorial sea is to be measured, should be included in the 
bill. Secondly, the article stating that the latéral délimitation was to be 
arrived at through bilatéral agreements, lacked légal force in the eyes of 
the Conseil d’Etat. Art. 3 finally, which read : « La législation belge s’ap­
plique à la mer territoriale », was thought to create the impression that the 
Belgian législation would have to be applied in toto in that zone. It belonged 
however to the prérogatives of the legislator to determine which rules 
would apply in that zone (91).
Taking into account these observations, the government bill was redrafted 
and submitted to the House of Représentatives in the following form :
Article 1er
La largeur de la mer territoriale de la Belgique est portée à douze milles 
marins, soit vingt-deux mille deux cent vingt-quatre mètres, mesurée à 
partir de la laisse de basse mer de la côte, ou des hauts fonds découvrants à 
marée basse pour autant qu’ils se trouvent à moins de douze milles marins 
de cette laisse de basse mer, ou des extrémités des installations portuaires 
permanentes dépassant ladite laisse de basse mer, comme il est indiqué sur 
les cartes marines officielles belges à grande échelle.
Art. 2
Les accords que le Roi conclut aux fins de déterminer les limites latérales 
de la mer territoriale de la Belgique avec celles de la France, d’une part, 
et des Pays-Bas, d’autre part, sortiront leur plein et entier effet.
Art. 3
Toute référence dans la législation ou réglementation belge à la mer 
territoriale de la Belgique s’entend dans le sens d’une mer territoriale dont 
la largeur est conforme à celle fixée par la présente loi (92).
(90) Exposé des motifs concernant le projet de loi fixant la largeur de la mer territoriale 
belge (hereinafter cited as Exposé des motifs), Documents of the House of Représentatives of 
21 October 1986, n° 635/1 (1986-1987), p. 1 ; Exposé introductif du Ministre des Relations 
extérieures (hereinafter cited as Exposé Chambre), Documents of the House of Représentatives of 
17 December 1986, n° 635/2 (1986-1987), pp. 1-2 ; Exposé du Ministre des Relations extérieures 
(hereinafter cited as Exposé Sénat), Documents of the Senate of 2 June 1987, n° 451/2 (1986-1987), 
pp. 1-2.
(91) Avis du Conseil d’Etat, Documents of the House of Représentatives of 21 October 1986, 
n° 635/1 (1986-1987), pp. 3-4.
(92) Projet de loi, Documents of the House of Représentatives of 21 October 1986, n° 653/1 
(1986-1987), p. 5.
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The Foreign Affairs Commission of the House of Représentatives discussed 
the draft on 17 December and approved the government bill by unanimity 
■with the exception of Art. 2 which was deleted altogether. The latter was 
thought to impair the constitutional prérogatives of the legislator for it 
would allow the executive branch to fix the territorial boundaries of Belgium 
ail by itself and not by law as required by the Constitution (93). The sound- 
ness of this légal reasoning will be scrutinized later on (94). In this form 
the bill passed the House of Représentatives, where no further discussion 
took place (95), as well as the competent Commission of the Senate (96) 
and the Senate’s plenary (97).
IV. COMPABISON WITH FRANCE,
THE NeTHERLANDS, THE UNITED KlNGDOM
Before drawing conclusions, it may be useful at this point to refer briefly 
to the législation of countries possessing a joint maritime boundary with 
Belgium, namely France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.
A) France
The French law of 1971 consists of five short articles (98). It first brings 
the limit of the territorial sea up to 12 nautical miles, delines the baseline 
and states that the French sovereignty extends to the air space over the 
territorial sea as well as to its bed and subsoil (99). The provisions concerning 
délimitation between states with adjacent and opposite coasts reb'es on the 
médian line as guiding principle (100). The law also provides for the possi- 
bility of establishing a transit regime for shipping if the extension would 
preclude a stretch of high seas, necessary for navigation (101). This enact-
(93) Rapport fait au nom de la Commission des Relations Extérieures par M. Van Wambeke 
(hereinafter cited as Rapport Yan Wambeke), Documents of the House of Represéntatives of 
17 December 1986, n° 635/2 (1986-1987), p. 2.
(94) See infra notes 124-139 and accompanying text.
(95) Parliamentary Annals, House of Représentatives, 1986-1987, n° 19, 14 January 1987, 
pp. 579-580. The final voting took place the day afterwards in one and the same breath with 
four other unrelated bills. Out of the 172 members present, 171 voted in favour, with one 
abstention. Parliamentary Annals, House of Représentatives, 1986-1987, n° 20, 15 January 1987, 
pp. 625, 637-638.
(96) Adopted by unanimity. See Rapport fait au nom de la Commission des Relations 
Extérieures par M. Laverge (hereinafter cited as Rapport Laverge), Documents of the Senate of 
2 June 1987, n° 451/2 (1986-1987), p. 6.
(97) Parliamentary Annals, Senate, 1986-1987, n° 107, 13 July 1987, p. 2806. For the final 
voting eee Parliamentary Annals, Senate, 1986-1987, n° 115, 18 July 1987, pp. 3054-3055. Out 
of 150 members present, 141 voted in favour and 9 abstained.
(98) See supra note 88. For short commenta and text, see also 17 Annuaire Français de 
Droit International, p .  1073 (1971) and 76 Revue Générale de Droit International Public, 
p p .  192-195 (1972). See also J.-P. Q u e n e u d e o , Chronique du droit de la mer, 17 Annuaire 
Français de Droit International, p p . 759-770 (1971).
(99) Art. 1.
(100) Art. 2.
(101) Art. 3.
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ment honors the existing fishing agreements in that zone (102) and applies 
to the French over-seas territories as well (103).
B) The Netherlands
The « Wet grenzen Nederlandse territoriale zee » of 1985 (104) comprises 
nine articles of which five relate to amendments of prior législative enact­
ments. The article extending the territorial sea up to 12 miles and defining 
the baseline resembles Art. 1 of the Belgian law, but does not mention 
permanent harbour works (105). It adds to the latter a définition of the 
low-water line. A  system of baselines is also established to distinguish 
between Dutch internai waters and its territorial sea (106). According to 
this law, latéral délimitation is to be arrived at by agreement with neigh- 
bouring countries (107). A special clause was inserted with respect to the 
Ems estuary (108). A  final article détermines the date on which the law 
will enter into force as well as its exact title (109).
C) The United Kingdom
The United Kingdom started the process of extending its territorial sea 
up to 12 nautical miles not so long ago. Due to recent parliamentary élections 
a numbér of bills, including the one on the territorial sea, which were waiting 
for parliamentary debate, were adopted as a package deal just before Par- 
liament was dissolved.
The Royal Assent was notified to the House of Lords on May 15, day of 
the latter’s adjournment sine die (110). According to Art. 4 (2) an Order in 
Council of 21 July 1987 brought this Territorial Sea Act of 1987 into force 
on 1 October 1987 (111). It consists of four elaborated articles, with two 
schedules in annex : One enumerating the amendments to be made to
(102) Art. 4.
(103) Ait. 5.
(104) Se© supra note 89. For a short description see 17 Netherlands Y.B. Int'l L., pp. 244- 
246(1986).
(105) Art. 1.
(106) Art. 2.
(107) Art. 3.
(108) Art. 3 (2). See in this respect the Explanatory Memorandum to this Bill óf 29 October 
1982, Annex to the Proceedings of the Second Chamber, 1982/1983 — 17.654, n° 3, pp. 9-10.
(109) Article 9. This law entered into force on 1 June 1985.
(110)See House of Lords Hansard, Vol. 487, 14 May 1987, column 821. Although amendments 
were made during the committee stage (see ibid., Vol. 484, 19 February 1987, columns 1212- 
1221) as well as during the report stage (see ibid., Vol. 485, 2 March 1987, columns 442-449), 
they were ail withdrawn. The Act as it appeared in Halsbury’s Statute Service (Issue 16,
49 Water pp. 35-41) is consequently identical to the bill introduced to the House of Lords 
and ordered to be printed on 15 January 1987 (London, St. Stephen’s Parliamentary Press, 
6 p. (1987)).
(111) Territorial Sea Act 1987 (Commencement) Order 1987, SI 1987/1270 as mentioned 
by the monthly review August 1987 of Halsbury’s Law (Vol. 20, para 160). This entry into force 
went not that smooth as inter alia experienced by Belgian fishermen, since changes were also 
made to the location of the charted limits around Seven Stones, W olf Rock, Goodwin Sands, 
Kentish Knook, Haisborough Sand and Bail Rock.
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prior enactments and a second one concerning the repeals. Art. 1 states the 
principle of a 12-mile territorial sea, to be established by Order in Council 
but also allows for dérogations in the same manner. It provides that the 
baselines shall be established by Order in Council and gives effect to those 
already in force. A section similar to Art. 2 of the Belgian law is to be found, 
as well as a définition of the term nautical mile. Art. 2 preserves the opéra­
tion of any local Acts on the present limits of existing jurisdiction of any 
harbour or port health authority, which do not require automatic extension. 
With respect to coal and petroleum exploration and exploitation some 
provisions remain unaffected, i.e. in a belt located between 3 and 12 miles 
this spécifié législation will remain applicable. Art. 3 provides for amend­
ments and repeals in existing législation and has to be read together with 
Schedules 1 and 2, as mentioned before. Art. 4, finally, gives the short title, 
makes the Act applicable to Northern Ireland and includes the possibility, 
by Order in Council, to extend its provisions to the Channel Islands and 
the Isle of Man.
V . C o n c l u s io n s
Based on the général international setting, on the position of Belgium on 
the internai and international level throughout the years as well as on the 
législative action of the countries surrounding the Belgian coastal waters, 
the following conclusions can be arrived at with respect to the Belgian law 
fixing the breadth of the territorial sea at 12 nautical miles. For the sake of 
clarity, a distinction will be made between the purpose of this enactment, 
its timeliness, its form and finally its content.
A) Purpose
The explanatory memorandum attached to the government bill when it 
was introduced to the House of Représentatives, as well as the oral state­
ments made by the Minister of Foreign Affairs before the competent 
commissions of the House and the Senate only referred to the changing 
général trend in state practice inclined to set the limit of the territorial sea 
at 12 miles. It is, however, submitted that the extended pollution prévention 
and monitoring powers with respect to shipping, bestowed upon the Belgian 
government in a belt of coastal waters between 3 and 12 miles, was not a 
negligible factor in this respect (112).
It did form part of the French explanatory memorandum (113) and not 
without reason. After the grounding of the fully loaded oil tanker Torrey 
Canyon on 18 March 1967 about 7 miles northeast of the Scilly Isles, and the
(112) See supra notes 67-87 and accompanying text.
(113) Journal Officiel, Doc. Ass. Nat. l r0 session, 1971-1972, n° 2020. See also 2 E. L a n g a - 
v a n t , Droit de la mer : le droit des communications maritimes, Paris, Cujas, p .  42 (1981) and 
J.-P. Q u e n e u d e c , supra note 98, p .  766.
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ensuing oil pollution which also affected the French coast substantially, 
the French government could only note the problem encountered by the 
British government when trying to take swift action against a Liberian 
tanker, located outside the British territorial sea but polluting its shores and 
those of France on a scale never experienced before (114). Also in the 
Netherlands this double argument (oil pollution prévention — monitoring 
of vessels) played a primordial rôle in revising the traditionally supported 
3-mile rule (115). The same arguments are finally encountered when 
analyzing the British changing attitude in this respect (116).
Taking into account the dense traf&c in the West Hinder-Vlissingen 
route (117) and also the recent inauguration on 12 October of the port o f 
Zeebrugge for regular commercial deliveries by the LNG carrier Methania, 
this new Belgian législation not only brings Belgium in line with most other 
countries, but it gives the Belgian government adequate tools to cope with 
the intensive shipping in front of its coast. Since an extension of rights 
normally also implies an increase of obligations, the Belgian government 
will find itself confronted with some extra duties to be carried out in this 
respect.
Following the same line of reasoning, the introduction of an economic 
zone in front of the Belgian coast would be most advantageous. In such a 
zone the 1982 Convention delegates inter alia certain pollution prévention 
powers, previously belonging to the flag state, to the coastal state. It would 
in fact enable Belgium to monitor the Noord Hinder South traffic séparation 
scheme more closely and effectively (118).
(114) When the ship finally broke up under heavy seas, the Royal Air Force even bombed 
the ship in an atterapt to burn up any remaining oil. This incident resulted in the intervention 
Convention. See supra note 82.
(115) See the preamble of the 1985 law, supra note 78. See also H. d e  J o n g , « Extension of 
the Territorial Sea of the ICingdom of the Netherlands », 30 Netherlands Int'l L. Rev., p. 129, 137 
(1983) as well as the Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 108, p. 6, which elaborated these 
reasons in greater detail following the advisory opinion of the Dutch Conseil d’Etat. See Annex 
to the Proceedings of the Second Chamber, 1982-1983 —  17.664 B, p. 1.
(116) Introduction on behalf of the government by Baroness Young in the House of Lords 
(see House of Lords Hansard, Vol. 484, 5 February 1987, columns 381, 381-382). See also speeches 
made by Lord Nathan (ibid., columns 389, 390-391) and Lord Campbell of Croy (ibid., co­
lumn 391, 393). See also A. C o u p e r , « The Marine Boundaries of the United Kingdom and the 
Law of the Sea », 151 The Oeographical Journal, n° 2, p. 228, 235 (1085) and J. Ca b l e , « Closing 
the British Seas », 11 Marine Policy, p. 90, 98 (1987).
(117) From July 1975 until January 1980 the Dutch North Sea Directorate of Rijkswater­
staat conducted research with respeot to the traffic flow of vessels in the North Sea, called 
« North Sea traffic analysis by visual identification ». Useful information can also be derived 
from this study relating to the traffic density in front of the Belgian coast. According to this 
aerial observation project the West Hinder-Vlissingen route had a calculated traffic flow of
50 ships per day. See North Sea Directorate, A  Bird's Eye View of the Shipping Traffic on the 
North Sea (Rijkswaterstaat Communications, n° 33/1982), Part I, The Hague, Government 
Printing Office, p. 52 (1982). See also annex 8 in Part II.
(118) In front of the Belgian coast, the North Hinder South traffic séparation scheme 
averages 105 ships per day. Ibid. Belgium would for instance certainly have to grade up its 
surveillance capability with respect to its part of the North Sea as far as environmental matters 
are concerned. At present land-sea surveillance is unknown, air-sea surveillance non-existont
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B) Timeliness
Of its continental neighbours, Belgium was the last country to follow suit 
by enlarging its territorial sea up to 12 nautical miles (119). When looking 
back on the général attitude of the Belgian government towards inter- 
nationally agreed rules concerning the law of the sea, one is left with the im­
pression that the law of the sea formed for a long time a low-key issue for the 
Belgian government (120). Lately, however, some changes seem to have 
occurred within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (121). At present Belgium 
appears to be more determined to elaborate, and consequently adhere to, 
a coherent maritime policy (122) of which the extension of the territorial 
sea constitutes a first tangible step.
C) Form
As mentioned before, the breadth of the Belgian territorial sea had 
always been regulated by royal decree. Accordingly, it would have been 
sufficiënt for the government simply to repeal the old royal decree and to 
replace it with a new one. The government nevertheless thought it appro- 
priate to introducé the new maritime boundary by law. In the memorandum 
of understanding, as well as by means of the oral statements made by the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs before the competent commissions of the House 
and the Senate, two reasons were forwarded in this respect : Firstly, a law 
seemed preferable for it gave the enactment a more solemn character. 
Secondly, the example set by France and the Netherlands incited the 
Belgian government to act accordingly (123).
and sea-sea surveillance irregular. See T. I jls tra , « Enforcement of International Environ- 
mental Instruments in the North Sea : The Missing Link », in The Status of the North Sea En­
vironment, Reasons for Concern (Peet, G., ed.), Proceedings of the Second North Sea Seminar 
held in Rotterdam, 1-3 October 1986, Amsterdam, Stichting Werkgroep Noordzee, p. 289, 
293 (1986).
(119) Or to use the words of an article commenting on the Dutch extension of its territorial 
sea in 1986, which appeared in the Belgian press : « Voilà donc notre pays —  comme souvent en 
ce qui concerne les choses de la mer —  en retard sur ses voisins ». See R. Plancha», « L ’extension 
des eaux territoriales belges », Lloyd Anversois du 27 décembre 1985.
(120) E. V o l c k a e r t ,  « Formulation of National Marine Policy : The Case of Belgium », 
10 Marine Policy, pp. 90, 90 and 100 (1986). This author states that a rigid and centralized 
governmental policy has never been developed and that Belgium never paid a lot of attention 
to the océans. Some justification for this attitude can certainly be found in the hardly enviable 
geographical position of Belgium when it cornes to marine matters. See A. v a n  d e r  E s s e n , 
supra note 66, pp. 104-106.
(121) About the déclaration made by Belgium when signing the 1982 Convention, one 
commentator writes : « C’est avec conviction que nous approuvons les termes de cette déclara­
tion qui annonce un vent nouveau, soufflant dans la bonne direction, au plus haut niveau de la 
diplomatie ». See R. Planchar, « Droit de la mer : la Belgique a signé la convention des Nations 
Unies », Echo de la Bourse du 11 décembre 1984.
(122) A permanent coordination between the different Ministries was established and the 
government even consults at regular intervais with professors of international law of the 
différent Belgian universities. See Rapport Laverge, supra note 96, p. 6. A special working 
group has moreover been established to study the spécifié délimitation problems with respect 
to the Belgian continertal shelf. Statement of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, see Parliamentary 
Annals, Senate, 1986-1987, n° 12, 27 November 1986, p. 300, 300.
(123) See Exposé des motifs, Exposé Chambre and Exposé Sénat, supra note 90, pp. 1-2, 2 
and 2 respectively.
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These arguments are certainly not totally convincing, but the question 
remains whether a sound reasoning could be forwarded based on Belgian 
judicial décisions and opinions of authors. An underlying question, namely 
whether the territorial sea had to be equated with the state’s territory, did 
not receive a clear eut answer until 1976. For a long time the opinion 
prevailed that the territorial sea did form part of a state’s territory. Belgium, 
for instance, stated expressis verbis in an amendment to the respective bases 
of discussion during the 1930 Codification Conference : « ... le territoire d’un 
Etat s’étend à une zone baignant ses côtes . . . »  (124). This was totally in 
accordance with the statement made by Mr. Rolin during the Conference 
itself (125). A  note under a judgement of the Belgian Cour de Cassation 
in 1962 by the avocat général browsed through this issue for the court of 
appeal had labeled the territorial sea as « étant une étroite dépendance du 
domaine terrestre ». Mr. Ganshof van der Meersch came to the conclusion 
that a certain shift of emphasis had occurred and carefully suggested that 
the latter had probably inspired the court to use this more balanced termi- 
nology (126). The Cour de Cassation sustained this point of view (127). A  
main reference manual on Belgian constitutional law nevertheless stated 
in 1975 : « The national territory also comprises the internai waters (streams, 
rivers, lakes) and the coastal sea » (128). Consequently, since the « coastal 
sea » formed part of the state’s territory, the Belgian Constitution would 
have prohibited the government of settling the matter by royal decree (129).
On 27 April 1976 the Conseil d’Etat called a définitive hait to this inter­
prétation by rendering its opinion in the case « Y.Z.W. Koninklijk Belgisch 
Yachting Verbond t / Provincie West-Vlaanderen », implying that the 
territorial sea does not form part of the state’s territory (130). The reform
(124) Belgique. Amendement à la base de discussion n° 1, distribué aux membres de la 
Commission le 18 mars 1930, reprinted in Actes de la conférence pour la codification du droit 
international, Vol. III, Annexe II, League of Nations Doc. C.315(b).M.145(b).1930.V (L.N. 
Pub. n° 1930.V.16), p. 182, 182 (1930).
(125) Reprinted in ibid., p. 26. Mr. Rolin said : « Ce à quoi nous tendons, c’est à l’assimilation 
complète, en principe, de la mer territoriale avec le territoire ... je pense qu’il serait peut-être 
bon d’affirmer cette correspondance entre la mer territoriale et le territoire et de dire que ... la 
mer territoriale fait partie du territoire ».
(126) Note by G a u s h o f  v a n  d e r  M e e r s c h , swpra note 1, pp. 377-378. A  comment on the 
said judgement agreed with this interprétation. See note of E. R ig a t jx  under Cour de Cassation, 
23 novembre 1963, 17 Revue Critique de Jurisprudence Belge, pp. 227, 230-231 (1963).
(127) Cour de Cassation, 23 novembre 1963, Pasicrisie, I, p. 374, 380 (1963).
(128) English translation by the author of A. M a s t , Outline of Belgian Constitutional Law (in 
Dutch), Gent, Story-Scientia, p. 55 (5th éd., 1975).
(129) Art. 3 of the Constitution states : « Les limites del’Etat, des provinces et des commîmes 
ne peuvent être changées ou rectifiées qu’en vertu d’une loi ».
(130) Verzameling der arresten van de Raad van State, pp. 426-433 (1976). The coastal 
province of West Flanders had levied a tax on pleasure yachts sailing the territorial waters. 
According to the Conseil d’Etat only the central government was competent to levy such a tax, 
but had not done so in casu. The underlying légal reasoning immediately invited criticism, 
although the practical outcome was generally agreed with : Y . L e j e u n e , «La mer territoriale 
fait-elle partie du territoire de la province? », Administration Publique, I , pp. 332-345 (1976- 
1977). See also J. V e r h o e v e n , 14 Revue Belge de Droit International, pp. 734-735 (1978-1979)
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of the Belgian state, which started soon afterwards, presented the Conseil 
d’Etat with more than one opportunity to restate and even refine its 
opinion on the matter (131). The territorial sea still does not form part of 
the Belgian territory, but the central government has power to delegate 
some of its powers to other entities (132).
This proved to be a workable solution for the ongoing state reform, but 
leaves the question here at hand, namely whether it is obligatory that the 
extension of the territorial sea be established by law, unresolved. Today, 
one can read in a revised édition of the above cited reference work on 
Belgian constitutional law : « The national territory comprises the land 
territory and the inland waters (streams, rivers, lakes). Nowadays it is 
generally admitted that the territorial sea does not belong to the actual 
territory of the state, but that the sovereignty of the state extends over 
the territorial sea» (133). If the territorial sea does not belong to the 
territory of the state, title I  of the Belgian Constitution does not apply (134). 
Nor does its Art. 3, which requires a law for changing Belgian state bound- 
aries.
It does seem awkward, however, in contemporary Belgian constitutional 
law that the government would be entitled, as it sees fit, to add a surface of 
say roughly 1000 km2 to the Belgian territory, over which this country 
exercises sovereign rights, without the approval of Parliament. The same 
observations apply to the latéral délimitation of these water expanses, 
where the government could possibly cede certain areas to which Belgium is 
entitled by virtue of international law (135). This feeling also prevailed in
reiterating the same arguments and E. S o m e r s , « The Division of Powers in Maritime Areas »,
17 Revue Belge de Droit International, p. 323, 329 and footnote 21 (1983/1).
(131) For a good overview see Y . v a n  d e r  M e n s b r u g g h e , « Scope of the Patent Régulation 
at Sea », (in Dutch), 45 Rechtskundig Weekblad, columns 1713, 1720-1726 (1981-1982). The 
main issue at stake could be resumed as follows : I f  the territorial sea was to be considered as 
forming part of the territory, provincial législation would mainly be applicable. If these waters 
were on the contrary labeled as extra-territorial, they would fall under the compétence of the 
central government.
(132) Ibid., column 1725. Although the Government promised at that time to do so urgently 
(Note of the Government on the territorial sea and the oontinental shelf. Documents of the 
House of Représentatives, n° 627/12 [1979-1980]), no bill was introduced so far to Parliament 
aiming at the decentralization of these powers. See Bulletin of Questions and Answers, Senate, 
1986-1987, n° 8, 2 December 1986, pp. 469-470. Question n° 6 by Mr. Didden of 12 November
1986.
(133) A. M a s t  & J. D u j a r d i n , Outline of the Belgian Constitutional Law (in D u tch ),  p. 75 
(8 th  r e v .  é d .,  1985).
(134) Y . v a n  d e r  M e n s b r u g g h e , supra note 131, column 1725. Consequently Art. 68 too, 
which looks upon the problem from the point of view of the Executive Branch and stipulâtes 
that no cessation, exchange or addition of territory can take place except by law, is not applic­
able.
(135) Bilatéral negotiations concerning maritime boundary délimitations are not always 
conducted on the sole basis of the internationally applicable légal rules on the subject. Extra- 
neous factors may be brought into play which are totally irrelevant in this respect. A good 
example can be found in the Agreements Concerning Fishery and the Continental Shelf between 
Iceland and Norway (see J. E v e n s e n , « La délimitation du plateau continental entre la Norvège 
et l’Islande dans le secteur de Jan Mayen », 27 Annuaire Français de Droit International,
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the Foreign Affairs Commission of the House of Représentatives, when the 
latter deleted the provision which would have enabled the government to 
arrange the latéral délimitation, which only forms a subtle part of the total 
area over which Belgium will acquire sovereign rights, at its discrétion. 
Although Mr. Baert and Mr. Defraignc (Chairman) both based their argu­
ment on the Constitution, which seems to be unjustified in the present 
state of affairs as explained above, the government reconciled itself to the 
argument of the Commission (136). During the debate in the Senate, the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs himself further confused the matter by stating 
that the extension of the territorial sea « peut être assimilée à une extension 
du territoire national » (137).
It is, therefore, submitted that légal arguments in this particular case 
were dictated rather by a particular situation, thought to be desirable, 
than vice versa ! The opinion of Mr. Lejeune, expressed when criticizing 
the légal reasoning of the 1976 judgement of the Conseil d’Etat proves 
ex post facto to have been the only légal construction capable of tackling 
the different problems encountered over the years in the desired manner. 
According to this author the territorial sea does form part of the territory 
of a coastal state. But since this dispute was only settled on the international 
plane during the beginning of the 20th century, the drafters of the Belgian 
constitution could most certainly not have intended to include this part of 
the territory within the Province of West Flanders (138). In principle the 
central government is competent, but the latter can at its discrétion delegate 
some of its powers, while remaining responsible on the international le- 
vel (139). This construction would have resolved in the desired manner first 
the case submitted to the Conseil d’Etat in 1976 (the provincial powers of 
West Flanders are limited by its territory, which does not include the 
territorial sea) secondly the state reform (the territorial sea does not belong 
to West Flanders, for only the central government, unless it décidés other- 
wise, is competent in this respect) and thirdly the necessity to enlarge the 
territorial sea by law and not be royal decree (for the territorial sea does 
form part of the Belgian territory : Arts. 3 and 68 of the Constitution are 
applicable).
When compared with the other pieces of législation analyzed above, the 
Belgian law certainly excels in succinctness. Of the three short articles 
introduced by the government only two survived parliamentary scrutiny. 
The pro’s and con’s of such approach will be further elucidated in the 
next section concerning the content.
pp. 711-738 [1982]) where Norway proved to be willing to make substantial geographical conces­
sions in order to accommodate its global security and foreign policy interests. See W . O s t r e n g , 
Norway in Northern Waters : Security and Resources Issues (C. Archer & D. Scrivener, eds.)» 
London, Croom Helm, pp. 155, 158-162 (1986).
(136) Rapport Van Wambeke, supra note 93, p. 2.
(137) Rapport Laverge, supra note 96, p. 5.
(138) Y . L b je t x n e , supra note 130, p. 341.
(139) Ibid., p. 342.
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D) Content
Of the four laws disoussed, only the French one does not specify that the 
nautical mile, referred to in its articles, corresponds with the international 
nautical mile of 1852 meters. Since the latter constitutes a nowadays 
generally agreed upon standard, this should not be considered as a deficiency 
in the French text but rather as an aiming at perfection of the others.
More important is the reference to the low-water mark by the Belgian 
législation (140). Similar provisions can be found in the enactments of 
France (141) and the Netherlands (142). The draft of the United Kingdom 
on the other hand, simply states that the baselines « shall for ail purposes be 
those established by her Majesty by Order in Council » (143). But then 
again, the entire British draft is based on Orders in Council and, what is 
more, can be amended, extended or annihilated through the same procedure. 
Even the breadth of 12 nautical miles itself is subject to such an except­
ion (144). Or as Baroness White remarked : « There is nothing in this Bill 
for which it is not also provided that it may be altered, removed, extended 
or changed, either by Order in Council or by a certificate. It is the most 
astonishing method of legislating » (145).
But even the reference to the same principle by the continental countries 
on this point, i.e. the low-water mark, does not resuit in a uniform method of 
determining the respective baselines, for the physical low-water mark may 
present itself in a wide variety of forms (146). The municipal enactments of 
Belgium (147) and the Netherlands (148) furthermore refer to the large-scale 
charts officially recognized by the coastal state (149). But this does not 
solve the problem for the fondamental option itself between the different 
low-water lines was left to the discrétion of the coastal state, resulting in 
possible lack of accordance between neighbouring countries (150). More- 
over, even if the same général standard is used by two or more countries, 
different results may be obtained (151).
(140) Art. 1.
(141) Art. 1 para. 2.
(142) Art. 1.
(143) Art. 1 (b).
(144) Art. 1 (2).
(145) Debate in the House of Lords (5 February 1987), supra note 116, column 394. See 
also column 396.
(146) 1 D. O ’ C o n n e l l , The International Law of the Seaf O x fo r d ,  C la re n d o n  P ress, pp. 173- 
174, w h e re  e ig h t  d iffe r e n t  m e th o d s  a re  lis te d .
(147) Art. 1 in fine.
(148) Art. 1 (2).
(149) As provided by Art. 3 of the 1958 Convention, which binds Belgium and the Nether­
lands, and Art. 5 of the 1982 Convention, signed by both countries.
(150) I. Attbrocoechea & J. Pethick, « The Coastline : Its Physical and Légal Définition », 
1 InVl J. Estuarine db Coastal L .t pp. 29, 35 (1986), who give an overview of the législation of 
Western European countries concerning the low-water mark.
(151) See infra note 155 and accompanying text.
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These complex issues have to be taken into àccount when diseussing the 
relations Belgium has with its maritime neighbours. Since this proves to be a 
non negligible complicating factor when it cornes to delimiting territorial sea 
boundaries, as will be seen infra, the position of the United Kingdom will 
not be commented upon (152).
Belgium adheres to the local mean lower low-water spring (153). For 
Ostend the internationally used tidal period of 18 2/3-year was used. For 
Nieuwpoort and Zeebrugge shorter periods were taken into considération 
due to a lack of available data. About every ten years these figures are 
compared with newly obtained data and adjusted if necessary.
The French « Zéro des cartes » is based on the lowest astronomical tide, i.e. 
< the lowest levels which can be predicted to occur under average meteoro- 
logical conditions and ünder any combination of astronomical conditions. 
These levels will not be reached every year » (154). It is clear that such a 
method will resuit in a low-water line which lies at a lower level than if a 
method were to be used, based on the actual measured daily low-waters. 
In practice this amounts to a différence of about 30 cm between French 
low-water line and the Belgian one.
The, mean lower low-water spring, adhered to by Belgiùm, is also the 
standard according to which Dutch maritime charts are drawn. Strangely 
enough, however, this does not resuit in an identical low-water line (155). 
A mixed commission, working on the estuary of the Western Scheldt, 
recently ran into this kind of trouble. It appears that the différences en­
countered are mainly caused by the shorter reference period used by Dutch 
authorities. Also the fact that the Belgian spring tide is measured around 
spring tide, whereas Dutch computers are able to cope with a much more 
rigid définition of spring tide, contributes to the différence, The low-wàter 
line in the Netherlands lies about 20 cm higher than the one used in Belgium.
Art. 2 of the Belgian law states in général terms that ail references made 
’in Belgian législation or régulations to the territorial sea, must from now on 
be understood as meaning a 12-mile territorial sea. It is the only piece of 
législation of the four countries here under considération, which does not 
provide expressis verbis for exceptions in this respect. The French law 
excludes existing fishing rights granted to foreign vessels either by inter­
national agreement or by municipal law (156). The laws of the Nether-
(162) The situation in the United Kingdom, where several norms are applied simultaneously 
is rathér complicated. See I. A u r r o c o e c h e a  & J. P e t h ic k , supra note 150, pp. 38-39.
(153) Chàrt Noordzee Vlaamse Banken, supra note 74.
(154) D. O’C ôïT N E iiii, supra note 146, p. 173.
(155) Gontra, the opinion of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Rapport Laverge, supra note 96, 
p. 4. As a matter of fact, since the Netherlands opted for the lower low-water spring in.l921,it 
has changed its définition of that concept three times. Three time periods must be distinguished 
if onôtàkes the'tide-tables as point of reference : 1921-1941, 1946-1986, 1987-,
(166) Art. 4.
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lands (157) and the United Kingdom (158) are even more explicit in this 
respect, citing by name the enactments which have to be amended or 
which constitute a dérogation of the général rule. Special attention in this 
respect should be attributed to the fact that both enactments leave un- 
affected the existing provisions relating to the extraction of coal, sand, 
gravel or petroleum in a belt from 3 to 12 nautical miles. As mentioned 
above, the Belgian continental shelf is not that rich in coal or petroleum, 
but concessions do exist with respect to sand and, to a lesser extent, gra­
vel (159). A  Royal decree of 16 May 1977 (160) restricts these activities to 
two well-defined areas of which the geographical co-ordinates are listed in 
annex to this decree (see map). It furthermore provides that the délimitation 
of these zones can only be altered under certain specified conditions (161). 
In 1981 a proposai was introduced to amend the 1977 decree exactly for that 
purpose (zone 3 on the map), but hitherto without concrete results (162). 
Consequently, exploitation is only allowed in zones 1 and 2, of which the 
former has so far been reserved for the public sector and zone 2 for the 
private sector. Zone 1, as will be noticed on the map, lies almost entirely 
outside the 12-mile limit. Of zone 2, on the contrary, only the northern part 
of the Oost Dyck (one of the three sandbanks located in that zone) remains 
outside the Belgian territorial sea. The Kwinte Bank, on the other hand,
(157) Arts. 4-8.
(158) Arts. 2 and 3, which have to be read together with schedules 1 and 2.
(159) For a list of Belgian législation on this topic, see E . So m e r s , « The Légal Status of the 
Belgian Continental Shelf», (in Dutch with English summary), 6 Water ( January-February 
1987) p. 3, 6 and note 19. At present six private companies hold concessions : N.V. Alzagri 
and N.V. Nieuwpoortse Handelsmaatschappij both for a yearly quantity of 1.000.000 ton ; 
N.V. D ’Hoore and N.V. Zeemineralen both for 500.000 m3 ; Tijdelijke Vereniging N.V. De 
Cloedt, N.V. Dredging International, N.V. De Nul for 650.000 m3 and finally N.V. Satie
• for 300.000 m3 (status at 11 August 1987. Mimeographed document obtained from the Ministry 
of Economie Affairs, Department of Mining). A juridical problem exists with respect to N.V. Al­
zagri, the demand for renewal of which was lost during a change in government. A  new demand 
was introduced by the company involved and a modus vivendi worked out by which N.V. Alzagri 
was allowed to continue exploitation. Even if a strict application of the rules were to suspend 
further exploitation, N.V. Alzagri could easily exploit together with N.V. Zeemineralen, 
company with which it has close ties, the part of the latter’s concession. Indeed, it has to be 
kept in mind that the companies only exploit a small percentage of the amount actually re- 
quested. In 1984, for instance, one company exploited between 30 and 40 % , two between 10 
and 20 %  and four less than 10 %  of the figure appearing in their concession. This has to be 
explained by the fact that ail companies involved are competitors on the same market. Only 
one or two will be selected, but ail want to make sure they have sufficiënt access just in case, 
See B. L a u w a e r t  & J. M o m m a e r t s , Sand and Qravel Exploitations on the Belgian Continental 
Shelf since 1976 (in Dutch), Brussel, Ministerie van Volksgezondheid en van het Gezin, pp. 8-9 
and 23 (1986).
(160) Arrêté royal du 16 mai 1977 portant des mesures de protection de la navigation, de la 
pêche maritime, de l ’environnement et d’autres intérêts essentiels lors de l’exploration, et de 
l ’exploitation des ressources minérales et autres ressources non vivantes du lit de la mer et du 
sous-sol dans la mer territoriale et sur le plateau continental, Art. 1, paras. 1 & 4 and annex, 
Moniteur belge du 21 juillet 1977. Pasinomie (Sér. 7) 1977, pp. 772-774.
(161) Ibid., Section 1, Art. 1, para. 2.
(162) Personal communication from the Ministry of Economie Affairs, Department of 
Mining.
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which malies up for about two thirds of the total volume of sand extracted 
in zone 2 (163), no longer forms part of the continental shelf stricto sensu. 
Since ail concessions granted in this zone are at present based on the 
Belgian législation on the continental shelf, some adjustments will have to be 
considered by the Belgian government.
Last but not least, the Belgian law does not give any clue as to the 
method to be implemented when delimiting the latéral boundary of the 
territorial sea. The French law points at the médian line in this respect (164). 
The Dutch law, on the other hand, states that latéral délimitation will be 
arrived at by way of agreement with the countries involved (165). As far as 
Belgium is concerned, reference should be made once more to the déclara­
tion, made when signing the 1982 Convention. Here it was said that Belgium 
« regrets that the concept of equity, adopted for the délimitation of the 
Continental shelf and the exclusive economie zone, was not applied again in 
the provision for delimiting the territorial sea » (166).
a. — France,
This country never became party to the 1958 Convention. French muni­
cipal législation, on the other hand, rewords the content of that Convention 
on this topic by forwarding the médian line as method to be applied. 
Together with Belgium it signed the 1982 Convention, which did not alter 
the respective provision of the 1968 Convention. In theory, it would seem an 
easy task for cartographers to draw a line every point of which is equidistant 
from the nearest points on the baselines. Several complicating factors 
present themeselves. First, as mentioned above, no common low-water line 
exists. Secondly, the maritime border area with France is characterized by 
the presence of low-water élévations, the low-water line on which may be 
used as baseline for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea (167). 
Condition for these low-tide élévations to be taken into account, however, 
is the fact that they must be surrounded by and above water at low tide. 
Depending on whether one uses the French « Zéro des cartes » or the Belgian 
standard, different baselines will present themselves, leading up to a 
different latéral boundary. Furthermore, the political option could be taken 
not to take these low-tide élévations into account when delimiting the 
latéral boundary. Finally, a system could also be adhered to where a mixed 
line is drawn based on the Belgian low-tide élévations measured from the 
Belgian low-water line and on French low-tide élévations from the French
(163) B. L a u w a e b t  & J. M o m m a e r t s , supra note 159, pp. 7 and 23.
(164) Art. 2.
(165) Art. 3 (1).
(166) English translation from the original French text, see supra note 68, p. 7. See also an 
elahorated answer of the Belgian government on this topio to the International Law Commission 
enclosed in U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/71 and add. 1-2, reprinted in 2 Y .B. Int'l L. Commission, pp. 79, 
80-82 (1953).
(167) See Art. 11 (1) of the 1958 Convention and Art. 13 (1) of the 1982 Convention.
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low-water line (168). Although some of these proposed limits coïncide, 
différences can be noticed when comparing these varions lines, ëspeciaUy 
further out from the coast.
b. —  The Netherlands
Similar technical problems as the ones just described occur with relation 
to the Belgian -  Dutch délimitation of the territorial sea, while others have 
to be added (169). The Netherlands ratified the 1958 Convention about 
six years earlicr than Belgium (170) and signed the 1982 Convention on 
the day the Convention was opened for signature (171).
First of ail there is the cartographical problem of the low-water line, as 
discussed above. Secondly the ancient Wielingen dispute surfaces once 
again (172). Thirdly, there is the seaward extension of the port of Zee- 
brugge (173). Fourthly, special attention has to be paid to thé fact that the 
Dutch law on the extension of the territorial sea uses a double set of base­
lines, which may lead to confusion. Indeed, this law makes a clear distinction 
between Art. 1, which defines the basel’nes from which the territorial sea is 
measured, and Art. 2, demarcating for purposes of the application of Dutch 
laws the boundary between internai waters and the territorial sea; The 
former has, in other words, an international character (174), the latter a 
merely municipal purview (175). It has been stressed in the èxplanatorÿ 
mémorandum attached to this law that Art. 2, defining the boundary 
between internai waters and the territorial sea, does not have ariy impact 
on the outer limit of the territorial sea as such (176). Closely connected 
with this fourth point are the closihg line of the Scheldt estuary and the
(168) Since the French low-water line is 30 cm lower that the Belgian one, such method 
Would be disadvantageous and unacceptable for Belgium, according to the opinion óf the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs. See Rapport Laverge, supra note 96, p. 4.
(169) See also énumération by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Rapport Laverge, supra 
note 96, pp. 4-5. As mentioned above, the problem of the low-water level is ignored by the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs. See supra note 156.
(170) This country signed on 31 October 1958 and ratified on 18 February 1966,
(171) 10 December 1982. .
(172) A  joint workshop gathering Belgian and Dutch international lawyers around the 
theme : « The Scheldt and its problems in international law » (held in Brussels on 23 November 
1984) showed that this problem, though dormant, still lingered on. See also Explanatory 
Memorandum, supra note 108, p. 10.
(173) It seems hardly conceivable that the Dutch govermnent would object such extension. 
See Art. 8 of the 1958 Convention and Art. 11 of the 1982 Convention.
(174) Hereinafter cited as international baseline.
(175) Hereinafter cited as municipal baseline. The advisory opinion of the Dutch Conseil 
d’Etat already stated that it would be desirable to elucidate in the Explanatory Mémorandum 
the relationship between this municipal boundary and Art. 5 of the 1986,Convention, i.e. the 
international baseline (see advisory opinion of the Dutch Conseil d’Etat, supra note 115, p. 1). 
The clarification on this point given by the Minister of Foreign Affairs implied that the municipal 
baseline was established açcording to the principles enshrined in the 1958 Convention, which 
may,only lead to further confusion (see Further Report, Annex to the Proceedings of the Second 
Ghamber, 1982/1983 -  17.654 C, p ..4). . . .
low-tide élévation of Rassen, located some three kilometers west of the 
Dutch island Walcheren. Normally, according to the 1984 law, only the 
low-tide élévation of Rassen should be taken into account when fixing thë 
international baseline of the territorial sea (177). A Dutch scientific article, 
however, commenting upon this law, referred to Art. 2 (2) (a), namely the 
closing line of the estuary of the Western Scheldt, when treating the dé­
limitation with Belgium (178), which should normally be subjected to the 
provisions of Art. 1 only. In the explanatory memorandum, moreover, to an 
earlier Bill, regulating title to the territorial seabed, the following statement 
is to be found in the middle of a passage dealing with the international 
baseline : « For the West Scheldt, the Netherlands has always applied a bay 
regime which means that on the landward side of a straight line across 
the mouth ... the West Scheldt is regarded as forming part of internai 
waters » (179). Summing up, one can say that where negotiations with 
France, which are actually under way, may soon lead to a conclusion, dis­
cussions with the Dutch government may prove more difficult (180). The 
Dutch hope to reach an agreement with Belgium on the délimitation of the 
territorial sea in the near future (181), may well prove hard to materialize.
After many years of persévérant adherence to the 3-mile principle, 
mainly inspired by a desire to protect its fishery industry, Belgium finally 
yielded to the external pressure, as evidenced by a général trend in state 
practice, to set the limits of the territorial sea at 12 miles. The graduai 
international acceptance of exclusive fishery zones, later on supplemented 
or substituted by exclusive economic zones, as well as the introduction by 
the European Economic Community of a Common Fisheries Policy, ail put 
the future of this fundamental argument, which for a long time determined 
the maritime policy of Belgium, at risk. Following these changes, the 
Belgian government recently re-evaluated its position on the breadth of 
the territorial sea and came to the conclusion that there existed in fact
(176) Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 108, p. 9. Here again a most peculiar phrase 
was added stating that the municipal baseline does not have any impact on the outer limit of 
the territorial sea « because the points of importance for that purpose are always located on the 
more seaward drawn low-water line or on the seaward edges of low-tide élévations ».
(177) Art. 1 (1). It is interesting to note that the low-tide élévation of Bassen was not taken 
into account by the Netherlands when fixing the boundary line between the outer limit of the 
territorial sea and the continental shelf in 1967. See Decree of 7 Febrüary 1967 exeouting 
Article 1, point two of the Continental Shelf Mining Law. Art. 1 (1).
(178) de Jong, supra note 115, p. 142. It is interesting to note that this author had stressed 
the clear distinction between Arts. 1 and 2 just a few pages before : « The boundaries between 
internai waters and the territorial sea do not affect the position of the outer limit of the territorial 
sea ... », {Ibid,, p. 141).
(179) Statement of 25 September 1979, Annex, Proceedings of the Second Chamber, 1979-1980 
-  15.819, n° 3, p. 4.
(180) Negotiations, as mentioned above, are still at the technical level. Diplomatie negotia­
tions will be the next necessary step. See answer to question n° 18 of Mr. Didden of 27 January
1987, Bulletin of Questions and Answers, Senate, 1986-1987, n° 21, 3 March 1987, pp. 1333-1334.
(181) Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 108, p. 10.
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more pro’s than con’s. Fisheries no longer playing a primordial rôle (182), 
the protection of the marine environment as well as the safety of shipping 
tilted the balance towards an extended territorial sea. The responsibilities 
accompanying this extension, on the other hand, as there are for example 
policing, maintaining order, keeping navigable channels clear, providing 
rescue services and certainly buoying and marking of wrecks, sandbanks 
and channels and so on (183), did not prove to be important enough to 
outweigh the advantages.
With this homework done, the Belgian government should not be tempted 
to rest on its laurels. Other, even more important issues will have to be 
confronted in the near future, of which the instauration of a possible 
exclusive economic zone and the délimitation of the maritime boundaries 
with its neighbours appéar to be the most important ones for Belgium right 
now.
Appendix
Loi fixant la largeur 
de la mer territoriale belge (*)
Article 1er
La largeur de la mer territoriale de la Belgique est portée à douze milles 
marins, soit vingt-deux mille deux cent vingt-quatre mètres, mesurée à partir 
de la laisse de basse mer de la côte, ou des hauts fonds découvrants à marée 
basse pour autant qu’ils se trouvent à moins de douze milles marins de cette 
laisse de basse mer, ou des extrémités des installations portuaires permanentes 
dépassant ladite laisse de basse mer, comme il est indiqué sur les cartes marines 
officielles belges à grande échelle.
Art. 2
Toute référence dans la législation ou réglementation belge à la mer territoriale 
de la Belgique s’entend dans le sens d’une mer territoriale dont la largeur est 
conforme à celle fixée par la présente loi.
(182) I f  one examines the amount of fish landings in Belgian ports for the. time period 
1939-1984, it becomes clear that the years 1946-1955 are to be considered as the top of a curve. 
Ever since that period a graduai décliné in the amount of fish landings has to be noted. The 
value of these landings during the same reference period, on the other hand, has experienced a 
quasi steady growfch. See Statistical Yearbook of Belgium (in Dutch), Nationaal Instituut voor 
de Statistiek, Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, Vol. 105, p. 229 (1985). Even if the quay-side 
value is expressed in real terms, a général upward trend can be discerned over the years. See 
The Belgian Sea Fishery : Catches and Returns (in Dutch), Ministerie van Landbouw, Dienst 
voor de Zeevisserij, p. 25 (1985). In 1986 this figure even reached the cape of 700 million. See 
ibid., 1986, issue, p. 25.
(183) See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
(*) Passed the House of Représentatives on 15 January 1987 and the Senate on 18 July 1987. 
Enters into the tenth day after its publication in the Moniteur belge, which occurred on 22 Oc­
tober 1987.
